"The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence." Philosophy of Science 84(4):639-658. 2017. [preprint]
In my dissertation, titled Sensible Concepts: Experience and the A Priori (abstract available here), I develop a new account of spatial experience that—unlike most contemporary theories of perception—situates our experience of space within a broader context of non-sensory cognitive activities. On my account, to perceive an object as square is, in part, to deploy the very same Euclidean concept of squareness that we utilize in a priori mathematical reasoning. Such geometrical concepts feature in, but are not derived from, experience. I show that this connection between our a priori and empirical representations of spatial features has profound implications for our understanding of perceptual experience, mathematical reasoning, and the interpretation of relativistic physics.
A summary of some of my other current and future research projects can be found here.