"The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence." Philosophy of Science 84:1-20 (2017; DOI: 10.1086/693465). [preprint]
In my dissertation, titled Sensible Concepts: Experience and the A Priori (abstract available here), I develop a novel account of spatial experience that—unlike most contemporary theories of perception—situates our experience of space within a broader context of non-sensory cognitive activities. On my account, to perceive an object as square is, in part, to deploy an a priori Euclidean concept of squareness – a concept that features in, but is not derived from, experience. I use this rationalist analysis of spatial experience to shed light on three issues: the connection between Euclidean proof and our perception of physical objects; the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; and the challenge posed to the veridicality of our spatial experience by the findings of relativistic physics.
A summary of some of my other current and future research projects can be found here.